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INTRODUCTION
If appointing some lawyers is good, then appointing more lawyers
must be better. At least that seems to be the logic of the civil Gideon
movement, which favors appointing counsel in civil cases just as Gideon
v. Wainwright required appointing counsel in criminal cases. The impulse is understandable: both indigent and pro se litigants face many
1
hurdles in civil courts, and the stakes can be quite high. But even
though criminal defendants do enjoy the Gideon right to counsel, the
quality and availability of indigent criminal defense remain hobbled by
inadequate funding. Gideon’s shortcomings in the criminal context
should caution us against assuming that a new judicially created right
will alleviate chronic shortages.
Over the last century, Powell v. Alabama, Gideon, and related cases
have steadily expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, from a right to retain one’s own counsel to a right
2
to appointed counsel in any case resulting in actual imprisonment.
3
Counsel must also meet minimum standards of effectiveness. The
services that must be provided have also grown to include expert assistance such as psychiatric examinations in criminal cases raising mental
4
health issues. Civil litigants have had much less success, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected a constitutional right to counsel
5
in a variety of civil proceedings. Rather than giving up hope, however,
1

See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 18-19
(2005) (identifying “a very serious shortage of civil legal assistance” and noting that
fewer than one in five indigent defendants has access to civil legal assistance).
2
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that appointment of counsel is necessary in a capital case “where the defendant is . . . incapable adequately of
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the
like”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963) (extending Powell to noncapital prosecutions); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972) (extending Gideon
to any offense that results in imprisonment). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 37374 (1979) (establishing an actual-imprisonment limitation on right to counsel).
3
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel as “deficient” performance that actually prejudices the
defendant).
4
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
5
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-33 (1981) (rejecting an
automatic right to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (deciding that qualified assistance, but not an attorney, must be provided when a prisoner faces involuntary transfer
to a mental hospital); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07, 610 n.18 (1979) (holding
that an impartial assessment, but not an adversarial hearing with a lawyer, is required
before committing a minor to a mental hospital); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583
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scholars and activists have continued to advocate for broad civil Gideon
6
rights. Most notably, the American Bar Association (ABA) endorses
appointing counsel for all poor people in adversarial proceedings implicating basic human needs, such as food, shelter, safety, health, or
7
child custody. Historically, bar associations’ support for expanding
8
Gideon has proven quite influential.
Last year, the Supreme Court reopened the civil right-to-counsel
debate by agreeing to hear Turner v. Rogers, in which a pro se mother
9
sued a pro se father for failing to pay child support. The issue was
whether the father had an automatic right to appointed counsel be10
fore he could be conditionally confined for civil contempt. Many
activists hoped that the Court would overturn or narrow its earlier
precedents and recognize a categorical right to counsel, at least in civil

(1975) (finding that students have no constitutional right to retain counsel in school
disciplinary proceedings); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (declining
to require retained or appointed counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings); see also
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320-26 (1985) (upholding
a fee limitation on attorney compensation for veterans’ benefits proceedings).
6
For example, since 2006 there have been at least three civil Gideon law review
symposium issues. See Symposium, An Obvious Truth: Creating an Action Blueprint for a
Civil Right to Counsel in New York State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2009); Symposium, A Right
to Counsel in Civil Cases: Civil Gideon in Maryland & Beyond, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 1
(2007–2008); Edward V. Sparer Symposium: Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to
Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006); see also CLEARINGHOUSE REV., July–Aug. 2006 (dedicating an entire issue to civil Gideon laws); Robert
W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 50506 (1998) (arguing for an expanded due process right to representation).
7
See STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ET AL., AM. BAR
ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 105 (REVISED) 1 (2010),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_105_revised_final_aug_2010.pdf. State bar associations
have also chimed in. See, e.g., Thomas M. Burke, A Civil Gideon? Let the Debate Begin, 65
J. MO. B. 5, 5 (2009) (advocating appointing counsel in civil proceedings where “basic
human needs are at stake”); Diane S. Diel, Speaking for the Justice System, WIS. LAW., Dec.
2008, at 5, 5 (describing an inquiry by bar association presidents to then–PresidentElect Barack Obama as to his intentions to establish a federal civil Gideon); Scott Russell, Minnesota’s Legal Safety Net: Many Hands Intertwined, 66 BENCH & B. MINN., Mar.
2009, at 22, 25 (2009) (discussing civil Gideon as the latest advocacy response to the
shortage of resources for indigent litigants); State Bar Signs on to Letter to Obama, McCain,
MONT. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 11, 11 (encouraging presidential candidates to embrace an
expanded right to counsel).
8
For example, the Supreme Court included a long, supportive quotation from
the ABA in extending Gideon to misdemeanor cases in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 39 (1972).
9
131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011).
10
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1919534

Barton&BibasFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

970

2/22/2012 12:00 PM

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 160: 967

11

cases that result in a deprivation of liberty. Instead, all nine Justices
rejected the claimed right to counsel, though a five-Justice majority
required courts to help pro se litigants navigate the process them12
selves. In child support proceedings, the majority noted, courts may
provide this assistance by (1) giving notice that ability to pay is a key
issue; (2) asking defendants to fill out financial disclosure forms; (3)
allowing defendants to respond to questions about their finances; and
13
(4) making express findings regarding defendants’ ability to pay.
Turner dealt the death blow to hopes for a federally imposed civil
Gideon. Thirty years ago, the Lassiter court rejected a civil Gideon right
in termination-of-parental-rights cases by a 5-4 vote over a vehement
14
dissent. By 2011, the civil Gideon argument could not garner a single
vote. That was true even though the defendant in Turner faced one
year in jail and Lassiter in dictum had presumed a right to appointed
15
counsel when physical liberty is at stake. Given the importance of
the liberty interest in Turner, the Court’s decision leaves little room
for advocates to insist that a lesser liberty interest qualifies for Gideon’s protections.
16
Though Turner upset many civil Gideon proponents, we should
not lament the decision but instead (mostly) praise it. In rejecting a
broad new constitutional right, the Court steered toward more sustainable reform for pro se litigants. The Court’s solution is far more
realistic than a grandiose new right to counsel. Indeed, funding for
counsel is scarce, existing lawyers are already overtaxed, and appointing civil lawyers would siphon time and resources from felony cases,
which are typically more important and more complex. In a world of
scarce resources, legislatures, courts, and legal aid organizations need
flexibility in order to triage cases. Both the Constitution and sensible
policy thus favor reserving appointed counsel primarily for criminal
11

For a partial list of the amicus briefs filed in Turner v. Rogers in support of a civil
Gideon right, see infra note 76.
12
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512.
13
Id. at 2519.
14
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 35 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court avoids what seems to me the obvious conclusion that due process
requires the presence of counsel for a parent threatened with judicial termination of
parental rights, and, instead, revives an ad hoc approach thoroughly discredited nearly
20 years ago in Gideon v. Wainwright.”).
15
Id. at 26-27, quoted in Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516.
16
For example, the legal blog Concurring Opinions hosted a post-Turner symposium that largely condemned the civil Gideon portion of the case. See Archive for the
Turner Symposium, CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/category/symposium-turner-v-rogers (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
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cases. Appointment of counsel in civil cases must be selective and discretionary, used only for the most complex and most meritorious cases.
While giving everyone a lawyer is an impossible dream, less expensive
pro se court reform is far more feasible. Turner did not explicitly discuss the importance of resource constraints, but its holding makes
much more sense given the reality of limited funds.
Properly handled, pro se court processes can be cheaper and fairer.
Extraordinarily, the Court noted that appointing counsel in pro se civil
cases could make the proceedings “less fair overall” and introduce un17
warranted “formality or delay.” Though that observation is a matter of
common sense, the Court’s prior case law had consistently praised law18
yers’ role in guaranteeing just procedures. Turner’s changed tune reflects a more mature, more nuanced view of lawyers and the complexity
inherent in the adversarial system. If Turner helps to spur new pro se
court processes that are simpler and fairer, everyone will benefit.
Part I of this Article surveys the state of the scholarly literature and
case law before Turner. Academics had long complained about chronic underfunding of indigent criminal defense while calling for more
money across the board. Civil Gideon reformers had likewise called for
funding civil counsel programs. But there was little sense that these
goals entailed tradeoffs and little emphasis on pro se court reform as a
viable, less costly alternative. The same activists sometimes endorsed
both of these goals, which are at least in tension with each other, if not
outright contradictory.
Part II analyzes Turner. The Court recognized that not all cases are
alike: even where the stakes are high, some cases are not complex
enough to require a lawyer. It also worried that appointing counsel
would add formality and delay, harming innocent parties on the other
side of civil proceedings. Further, the Court introduced a new focus on
the availability of less intrusive alternatives, notably pro se assistance.
Part III gives two-and-a-half cheers for Turner’s shift. The Court
wisely avoided creating a Procrustean civil Gideon rule and carefully
separated civil from criminal cases. It steered future developments
toward more sustainable pro se court reform. And though the Court

17

131 S. Ct. at 2519.
Starting with Powell v. Alabama and continuing through to Gideon and Argersinger,
the Supreme Court has treated the availability of a lawyer as an unqualified good and a
necessary ingredient of fair judicial procedures. For a discussion of some of this case
law, see BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
54-60 (2011).
18
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did not discuss funding limitations, its approach is consistent with the
need to triage cases. Criminal cases are more important and more
complex, and there is less of a role for lawyers in many civil cases.
We cannot and will not provide lawyers to everyone. Turner rightly
rejected that impossible dream. It is far more important to fund appointed lawyers in serious felony cases than it is to provide them in,
say, housing court. This Article concludes that the task ahead is to
make civil lawsuits simpler and more accessible to nonlawyers.
I. TOO MANY NEEDS, TOO FEW DOLLARS
In the decades preceding Turner, scholars and advocates challenged the dearth of appointed counsel and resources on a variety of
fronts. Capital defendants, they noted, suffer from woefully inadequate funding for lawyers and support services. Other felony and misdemeanor defendants likewise have overworked, underfunded lawyers
who quickly press them to plead guilty. The result is an epidemic of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In civil cases, resources are still scarcer. There are few appointed lawyers even in cases with significant
stakes, such as divorce, child custody, child support, housing, and immigration proceedings.
Yet these advocates rarely acknowledged the tension between their
competing goals in the criminal and civil contexts. Funding to appoint counsel is limited, and guaranteeing lawyers in more cases will
spread existing resources too thin. As it is, criminal defense lawyers
risk being ineffective because they have too little time and too few
support services. A broad civil Gideon right would thus effectively undercut Gideon itself.
A. Underfunding Criminal Counsel: Subverting Gideon
1. Capital Cases
For almost eighty years, the Supreme Court has recognized a right
19
to appointed counsel in capital cases. Yet, to this day, indigent capital defense remains scandalously underfunded. To guarantee effective
counsel, states must offer enough money to attract and retain qualified, experienced lawyers and to give them the investigative, forensic,
and administrative support they need. But funding indigent defense,
especially capital defense, is hardly a political priority, so attorney
19

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
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compensation is paltry. Capital defenders may be paid flat fees or
hourly rates subject to low statutory caps, which may work out to twelve
20
dollars per hour or less.
Nor is there enough funding for support services. Effective capital
defense requires thorough research into the facts surrounding the
crime as well as the defendant’s background, family, upbringing, mental health, and character. This research necessitates private investigators, paralegals, secretaries, and quite possibly forensic experts,
psychiatrists, doctors, and social workers. But the compensation described above hardly covers the basic overhead costs for secretaries or
paralegals. And many capital defenders must perform their jobs without any investigative or expert assistance at all. Courts sometimes deny
funding by requiring strong showings to justify expenses, or they award
21
only several hundred dollars to cover an entire trial. Poor funding
22
thus undercuts the right to expert assistance. As a result, few experienced lawyers are willing to take capital cases, and those who do lack
the time and tools to do a thorough job.
The problem is especially acute because capital cases are among
the longest and most complex proceedings in our legal system, and
capital defendants have the most at stake. Moreover, capital defense
attorneys are often outgunned by prosecutors who enjoy better pay
and investigative and expert support as well as more experience and
23
specialization in capital punishment. In some states, certain prosecu-

20

See, e.g., Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (overturning death sentence on federal habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel was paid $11.84 per hour and “the justice system got only what it
paid for”); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1838, 1853, 1868 (1993) (collecting
examples of inadequate compensation for indigent defense, with some rates as low as
$4.05 per hour); Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 323-26 (2010) (describing
egregious examples of inadequate, incompetent, and underpaid indigent defense).
21
See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement
Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 76-77 & n.158 (noting underfunding
of expert assistance for indigent defendants and arguing that “the asymmetry in resources is pronounced”).
22
See Cara H. Drinan, The Revitalization of Ake: A Capital Defendant’s Right to Expert
Assistance, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 288-96 (2007) (describing a variety of statutory and
judicial hurdles that contribute to a pervasive lack of expert assistance in capital cases).
23
See Bright, supra note 20, at 1844-48 (“In contrast to the prosecution’s virtually
unlimited access to experts and investigative assistance, the lawyer defending the indigent accused in a capital case may not have any investigative or expert assistance to
prepare for trial and present a defense.”).
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tors specialize in capital prosecutions, while there is no comparable
public defender unit. Instead, defense lawyers are appointed ad hoc
24
and cannot develop repeat-player expertise.
Two recent Georgia cases are particularly galling. In Phan v. State
and Weis v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court forced death penalty trials to proceed even though Georgia had stopped paying the defend25
ants’ lawyers when the State’s indigent defense fund went bankrupt.
The result is a playing field tilted toward death. Ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the guarantee in the Sixth Amendment, is
rampant. The American Bar Association has lamented that “grossly
unqualified and under compensated lawyers who have nothing like
the support necessary to mount an adequate defense are often appointed to represent capital clients. In case after case, decisions about
who will die and who will live turn . . . on the nature of the legal repre26
sentation the defendant receives.” Poor training, preparation, and
27
compensation infect many capital trials. Significant funding increases
are needed to train and retain competent capital defense lawyers and
to give them the tools to do their job effectively.
2. Other Felonies
The capital defense system has received much attention—and some
28
additional funding—over the past twenty years. The rampant underfunding of noncapital defense, however, has largely flown under the
radar. Felony defenders are frequently paid much less than the prose29
cutors they oppose. Compensation can run as low as $40 per hour,

24

See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much
Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 690 (2010) (explaining the ad hoc system of judicially
appointing capital defense attorneys and the resulting perverse incentives for lawyers
who depend on judges for their income).
25
Phan v. State, 699 S.E.2d 9, 10-11 (Ga. 2010); Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350, 35358 (Ga. 2010). For a gripping overview of the logical and legal gymnastics in these
opinions, see Bright, supra note 24, at 691-97.
26
LESLIE A. HARRIS, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (1997),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/20110325_aba_107.authcheckdam.pdf.
27
See Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama’s Capital Defense Problems: It’s a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1992) (describing these
pervasive inadequacies in Alabama).
28
For example, the Justice for All Act of 2004 offers federal funding to improve state
capital defense. Justice for All Act of 2004 §§ 421–422, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14163–14163a (2006).
29
See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 230 (2004) (“By and large, entry-level prosecutors
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and per-case caps can be as low as $600 per case for less serious felonies
30
and $1235 per case for more serious felonies. Further, indigent defense lawyers carry heavy caseloads, often juggling hundreds of cases at
31
once. As one judge described managing 418 defendants over seven
months in New Orleans, “Not even a lawyer with an S on his chest could
32
effectively handle this docket.” Defenders, unlike prosecutors, typically
33
have little or no investigative or expert support. A survey of nearly two
thousand felony cases in Alabama showed that “no motions were filed
34
for funds for experts or investigators in 99.4% of the cases.”
Felony defenders also have little time to meet with their clients,
particularly when a face-to-face meeting would require a long trip to a
distant jail. Their only communication with each client may be no
more than a hurried conversation in a courtroom hallway or holding
cell in the few minutes before a court appearance. To manage their
crushing workloads, defense lawyers very often “meet ‘em and plead
‘em,” pressing their clients to plead guilty immediately before doing
35
any investigation. Naturally, defendants mistrust lawyers whose only
36
interest appears to be getting rid of their case.
Because funds are tight, many counties contract these services
37
out to the lowest bidder for a flat fee. Lawyers who accept these
contracts can continue to earn more money by handling private cases, and there is no financial incentive to attract good lawyers or provide zealous representation. Instead, the system encourages lawyers

earn higher salaries than entry-level public defenders. The salary differences persist at
every level of experience . . . .”).
30
Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 912-13
(2010); see also STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR
ASS’N, GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
9-10 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE] (cataloguing reported instances
of inadequate attorney compensation in various jurisdictions).
31
See Bright, supra note 20, at 1850-51; Wright, supra note 29, at 231.
32
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993) (quoting trial judge).
33
Wright, supra note 29, at 231.
34
GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 30, at 19.
35
See id. at 16 (describing the typical practice in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, as related by several witnesses who experienced the parish’s “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” lawyers).
36
See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1462-63 (2005) (noting the mistrust of public defenders and explaining
that it exacerbates this “not uncommon . . . ‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em’ scenario”).
37
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, LOW-BID CRIMINAL DEFENSE
CONTRACTING: JUSTICE IN RETREAT 1 (1997).
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to scrimp on support services, as any overhead or expert costs come
38
directly out of their own pay.
Numerous public interest organizations decry this state of affairs
and rightly call for reform. As the American Bar Association put it,
“Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the United
States remains in a state of crisis” in part because “[f]unding for indi39
gent defense services is shamefully inadequate.” The Constitution
40
Project emphatically agrees, as does the National Association of Crim41
inal Defense Lawyers.
In short, underfunded indigent defense systems offer chronically
ineffective representation. Defender organizations and public interest
groups have tried to solve the problem by filing lawsuits challenging
this state of affairs and seeking better funding. These lawsuits, how42
ever, have failed to result in meaningful change.
3. Misdemeanors
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court extended the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to misdemeanor charges that can result
43
in actual imprisonment. Thus, the right extends not only to hundreds of thousands of felony cases per year, but also to millions of
44
misdemeanors as well. Alabama v. Shelton further expanded that right

38

See id. at 2 (“Fixed-price contracts, requiring representation of all cases, inevitably result in case overload and inadequate representation with built-in incentives to
process cases quickly and disincentives to take cases all the way to trial. Such systems
discourage the use of investigators, forensic specialists, [and] expert witnesses . . . .”).
39
GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 30, at v.
40
NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7
(2009) (noting that inadequate funding leads to “astonishingly large caseloads” and
“second-rate legal services”).
41
See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 1 (complaining that
“maximum caseload standards are routinely ignored, needed experts are underutilized
and prolonged appellate delays are commonplace” (footnotes omitted)).
42
See Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1741 (2005) (noting that even three widely celebrated litigation success stories reflect “judicial reluctance to undertake sustainable
systemic indigent defense reform”). But cf. Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 462-63 (2009) (acknowledging the mixed record of success of these suits but expressing optimism about future
strategies focusing on indigent defense litigation in federal court).
43
407 U.S. 25, 37-40 (1972).
44
See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 461, 477 (2007) (reporting estimates that, since 1972, 690,000 felony cases and up
to 2.7 million misdemeanor cases per year required appointed counsel).
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to cases resulting in probation that could eventually be enforced by
45
imprisonment. Thus, a fair number of misdemeanor defendants receive appointed counsel; in federal court, for example, one-quarter
46
did between 2000 and 2005. Often, however, counsel is not immediately available and defendants must wait before receiving lawyers,
47
sometimes for months, even if they are jailed pending trial.
Even when lawyers are appointed, they often must juggle hundreds
of misdemeanors and have little time to spend on each one. Particularly in the most minor cases, defense lawyers do little more than ask
for, and often receive, lenient dispositions such as suspended sentenc48
es. Because of resource constraints, they hardly have the time or incentive to do anything else. Prosecutors and judges, for their part,
discourage filing motions and routinely treat minor cases as eligible
49
for nonprison sentences. Josh Bowers, a former Bronx public defender, has reported that prosecutors and defenders alike view some
low-level cases, such as public-order cases, as “disposables” that merit
50
cookie-cutter dispositions. This is a natural response to the crushing
number of misdemeanor cases on top of felonies: every actor in the
criminal justice system simply hurries cases along the plea-bargaining
assembly line.
B. The Civil Gideon Movement
Many parties to important civil disputes cannot afford counsel.
Tenants facing eviction, immigrants facing deportation, parents facing
45

535 U.S. 654, 658, 674 (2002).
Hashimoto, supra note 44, at 489-90.
47
See Michael Pearson, Judge: Fulton Must Cut Jail Load, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 17,
2002, at 1B, available at 2002 WLNR 4649292 (reporting that “lengthy delays in processing suspects accused of minor crimes is one of the main reasons the county jail is
overcrowded” and that “[s]ome [inmates] now go months before they are even arraigned” and receive lawyers). In Mississippi in 2003, a man charged with resisting
arrest spent two-and-a-half months in the county jail before he saw a lawyer. Adam
Liptak, County Says It’s Too Poor to Defend the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at A1. The
maximum punishment for resisting arrest in Mississippi is six months in jail and a fivehundred dollar fine. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-73 (West 2005).
48
See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 70, 72, 81 (1978).
49
See id. at 61-66, 103-06.
50
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1709 (2010). This concern is not new. In Argersinger,
the Court warned of the dangers of “assembly-line justice” and plea mills for misdemeanor defendants. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-36 (1972).
46
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termination of parental rights, and employees facing loss of their jobs
have no automatic right to appointed counsel. This is true even when
their opponent (be it the state, a landlord, or an employer) is represented by counsel. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) has estimated that less than one-fifth of low-income people’s legal needs are
51
being met. As a result, often legal services offices can offer only brief
52
advice, placement on a long waiting list for help, or nothing at all.
Even the current low level of LSC funding is in danger of being cut
53
much further.
To many, an appointed lawyer seems essential to balance the scales
and protect the poor and powerless. That understanding seems to
comport with Gideon itself, which recognized that “lawyers in criminal
54
courts are necessities, not luxuries.”
Calls for a parallel Gideon right in civil cases followed almost immediately on the heels of Gideon. As early as 1965, an indigent litigant
argued (unsuccessfully) that Gideon and the Due Process Clause re55
quired appointing counsel in a property dispute. Likewise, a 1967
Yale Law Journal Note argued that “if an affluent [civil] litigant cannot
56
get a fair trial without a lawyer, an indigent litigant cannot either.”
57
Other commentators soon followed.

51

LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 3 (updated
ed. 2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_
the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf.
52
See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 13-14 (2004).
53
The House Appropriations Committee proposed a $104 million funding cut for
the LSC for Fiscal Year 2012, a 26% reduction in funding from 2011. See Press Release,
Legal Servs. Corp., House Proposal Would Cut Civil Legal Aid by $104 Million (July 6,
2011), available at http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/house-proposal-would-cutcivil-legal-aid-104-million.
54
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
55
Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 901 (1966).
56
Note, The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1967).
57
See, e.g., Francis William O’Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The
Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 13 (1967) (querying why Americans’ constitutional
sensibilities “dull when innocent people are made to suffer by unjust decisions in civil
cases”); Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 554, 556 (1976) (arguing that “logic indicates that civil property
rights should receive the same protection” as “life and liberty”); Note, The Indigent’s
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 997 (1975) (suggesting one
“instance where constitutional rights may be violated by the failure to appoint counsel
in civil litigation”); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322,
1331 (1966) (“[T]he inability of the unskilled litigant . . . seems no less debilitating in
most civil litigation.”).
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Gideon was followed by two Court cases that seemed to support a
civil extension of Gideon. First, In re Gault extended Gideon to juvenile
proceedings that might result in confinement, even though juvenile
58
proceedings are not technically criminal. Gault reasoned that due
process guaranteed appointed counsel because the juvenile’s liberty
59
was at stake; the Court did not rely upon the Sixth Amendment at all.
Thus, where the liberty interest is important enough, the due process
right to appointed counsel can extend beyond Sixth Amendment
criminal cases.
Five years later, Argersinger v. Hamlin extended the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel beyond felonies to any misdemeanor
60
prosecution that resulted in jail time, however short. That set a low
bar for liberty interests, as many civil cases involve more serious deprivations than a day in jail: consider deportation, termination of parental rights, or a year in jail for civil contempt. Taken together, Gault
and Argersinger seemed to support a civil Gideon right. Nevertheless, no
lower court announced a broad constitutional guarantee of appointed
counsel in a civil case between Gideon and Lassiter, and the Supreme
61
Court cases between Argersinger and Lassiter were a mixed bag.
Lassiter itself dealt a crippling blow to civil Gideon hopes. It addressed a particularly serious liberty interest—termination of parental
62
rights. The Court presumed that “there is a right to appointed coun63
sel only where the indigent . . . may lose his personal freedom.” In
the absence of actual incarceration, this presumption weighs “against”
64
appointment of counsel. Lassiter also addressed a case brought by a
65
government lawyer in an area of law that can be quite complex. Nevertheless, the Court recognized no right to counsel.

58

See 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
Id. at 36-42.
60
407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
61
See, e.g., In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56-57 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that indigent
wives in divorce proceedings have no right to publicly compensated counsel and that
the issue is more appropriate for legislative resolution). For a helpful overview of the
pre-Lassiter cases and the difficulty in squaring them, see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507, 2516-17 (2011).
62
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1981).
63
Id. at 27.
64
Id.
65
See id. at 30 (“[T]he ultimate issues with which a termination hearing deals are
not always simple . . . .”).
59
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Following Lassiter, civil Gideon hopes lay fallow for many years.
One sign of a rekindling of interest was U.S. District Judge Robert
Sweet’s 1997 speech at Yale Law School advocating for appointed
67
counsel in civil matters. The speech was published in the Yale Law
and Policy Review and may have helped to renew interest in civil Gideon
68
rights. Some of these new supporters advocate civil Gideon rights in a
specific area of civil law; others attack Lassiter head-on; and still others
69
read U.S. treaty obligations as requiring appointed civil counsel.
C. Unacknowledged Tradeoffs and Competing Demands
Many proponents of a civil Gideon right fail to recognize three
fundamental truths: First, though Gideon has improved the quality of
felony defense somewhat, it has hardly been a ringing success, primarily because funds are inadequate and courts are loath to overturn convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, a judicially
created civil Gideon right would be even less protected than indigent
criminal defense. Third, a civil Gideon right would likely undermine
indigent criminal defense by stretching limited resources further.
Even if the money did not come directly from criminal defense funding, other areas of state budgets would feel the strain. Supporters of
recognizing a civil Gideon and of providing adequate funding for indigent criminal defense see themselves as fighting the same battle for
justice, without acknowledging the inevitable tradeoffs between the
70
two goals.

66

See HOWARD H. DANA, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES,
RESOLUTION 112A, at 10, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_06A112A.pdf (“For over
two decades, the Lassiter decision appeared to paralyze serious consideration of a right
to counsel in civil cases.”).
67
Sweet, supra note 6, at 505-06.
68
A Westlaw search in the JLR database for the term “civil Gideon” finds 217 articles, with only three mentions predating the publication of Sweet’s speech.
69
See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons from Gideon v.
Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 531-34 (2006) (asserting that Lassiter, like Betts v. Brady before it, should be overturned); Russell Engler, Shaping a ContextBased Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
697, 712 (2006) (arguing that certain private custody cases “are strong starting points
for civil Gideon strategies”); Sarah Paoletti, Deriving Support from International Law for the
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651, 654, 657, 659-60
(2006) (arguing that treaties and international norms support a U.S. right to counsel in
civil proceedings).
70
For example, the ABA advocates both additional funding for indigent defense
and civil Gideon. See RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE IN-
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Policy activists find establishing new rights through constitutional
adjudication appealing because it circumvents the political process.
Courts usually do not consider explicitly whether the government can
afford to behave constitutionally. If the Constitution requires lawyers in
civil court, the government will have to provide them regardless of cost.
Gideon and its progeny, however, expose two fallacies in this
strategy. First, courts weigh issues of cost implicitly even if they do
71
not make them explicit. Second, even if courts establish new rights,
it is up to legislatures to fund them. And if legislatures limit their support, the right will remain underfunded. Darryl Brown has established
72
that state funding for indigent defense is “epiphenomenal.” Using
data from all fifty states, Brown showed that funding is determined not
by the number of criminal prosecutions in each state, but rather by a
complicated blend of political factors largely uncorrelated with the
73
underlying need. In other words, political forces determine funding,
especially because courts find it far easier to lay out broad rights than
74
to force legislatures to fund them.
Thoughtful civil Gideon proponents have thus turned to legislative
lobbying. They have achieved some success in California, which in
2009 passed legislation requiring counsel for some civil matters, in75
cluding child custody and foreclosure proceedings. Statutory civil
Gideon rights may be problematic for other reasons, but at least they
leave legislatures free to revise them if they prove unworkable or too
expensive. Legislative rationing can be overt and subject to voters’
consideration at the polls; by contrast, rationing of judicially created
rights occurs through covert subversion and neglect.

DIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 8 (1993) (reporting on severe under-funding of appointed
criminal defense in the United States); infra note 76 and accompanying text.
71
Argersinger, the case that expanded Gideon to misdemeanor prosecutions, did explicitly discuss the availability of lawyers to staff misdemeanor cases. See 407 U.S. 25, 37
n.7 (1972) (using nationwide statistics to counter the fear noted in Justice Powell’s concurrence that there were insufficient attorneys to represent misdemeanor defendants).
The majority did not address the cost of these additional lawyers, however. See id.
72
Brown, supra note 30, at 908.
73
Id. at 915-20.
74
For an excellent overview of the generally unsuccessful attempts to win greater
Gideon funding through lawsuits, see Note, supra note 42, at 1736-41.
75
Act of Oct. 11, 2009, 2009 Cal. Stat. 2498 (codified in scattered sections of CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE and CAL. GOV’T CODE); see also Tamara Audi, ‘Civil Gideon’ Trumpets Legal Discord, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at A3 (describing the funding for the
California law).
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II. TURNER ’ S TURN TO REALITY
The Supreme Court’s decision to hear Turner spurred renewed optimism among civil Gideon proponents. Many public interest law
groups filed amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, arguing that a
76
right to counsel was essential to prevent injustice. The Court disappointed them, unanimously rejecting the claimed categorical right.
The majority advanced three basic reasons for not recognizing a civil
right to counsel. First, it recognized that different cases have differing
levels of complexity and differing needs for lawyers. Second, it worried about the excessive formality and delay that lawyers often introduce into civil proceedings. Finally, it recognized the availability of
less intrusive alternatives, most notably pro se legal assistance. This
Part addresses each reason in turn.
A. Gradations of Complexity and Need
Turner’s argument for a civil right to counsel leaned heavily on his
interest in avoiding an erroneous deprivation of liberty. The Court
acknowledged that his interest in physical liberty was significant and
77
did require due process protection. But that interest, although significant, was not dispositive.
The Court rightly gave substantial weight to the simplicity of the
issue in dispute. Lawyers may be essential to parse complex statutes
and technical regulations. But the heart of most child support enforcement actions concerns the basic question of whether the noncustodial parent has the ability to pay. At least when courts follow proper
procedures, determining ability to pay is usually a commonsense matter of articulating income, expenses, and assets. Anyone can tell a
judge where he works, how much he earns per week, and how much
he spends on rent and medical bills.

76

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petitioner at 8, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10); Brief of Center for Family
Policy & Practice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, Turner, 131 S. Ct.
2507 (No. 10-10); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner at 9-12, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); Brief of the Legal Aid Society of the
District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8, Turner, 131 S.
Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 5, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10);
Brief of Elizabeth G. Patterson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10,
Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10).
77
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518.
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Similarly, every day, unrepresented criminal defendants must
prove that they are indigent before they can qualify for court-appointed
78
counsel. Indigence is a simple factual prerequisite to counsel, not an
issue that itself requires counsel. The Court left open whether there
might be a right to counsel in the occasional exceptionally complex
79
case, as Turner made no such claim. But while lawyers might be
marginally helpful in routine cases, they are not essential to satisfy
due process.
B. Concerns with Formality and Delay
Nor did the Court subscribe to the faith that lawyers always improve proceedings. Decades earlier, it had noted Judge Friendly’s wise
caution about lawyers’ cost: “Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are [the lawyer’s]
80
right but may be his duty.” The Court embraced that point in Turner,
noting that lawyers can change the nature of proceedings by making
81
them slower and more complex. One must consider not only the
noncustodial parent but also the custodial parent, who is often forced
to pursue her claim pro se precisely because she is impoverished by
the nonpayment of child support. Providing a lawyer for only one par82
ent would tilt the scales, perhaps making proceedings less fair overall.
In other words, the Court balanced tradeoffs and downsides instead of
assuming that more lawyers and more process are always better.
The history of criminal procedure confirms the Court’s rational
observation that lawyers make proceedings slower and more technical.
As John Langbein has argued, the advent of legal representation great83
ly increased the length and complexity of criminal proceedings. By
78

See, e.g., id. at 2518-19.
Id. at 2520.
80
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (quoting
Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973)
(explaining that the addition of defense attorneys in revocation proceedings could
sacrifice the system’s “informality, flexibility, and economy”).
81
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
82
See id. at 2519 (cautioning that providing counsel to only one parent could create
an “asymmetry of representation” that would undermine the fairness of the proceeding).
83
See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 16-17 (2003)
(noting that before the advent of the adversarial system, trials took fifteen to thirty
minutes); see also John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining,
13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 262-65 (1979) (describing how summary jury trials in the
79
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the time Gideon was decided, technical rules of evidence, pleading, and
procedure had grown too complex for laymen to grasp. Now, “lawyers
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries,” because only they have
84
“skill in the science of law.” This requirement may well have been
necessary for criminal defendants, given both the Sixth Amendment
and the high stakes in criminal cases. But the Court was wise to pause
before likewise mandating lawyers in civil cases. That is doubly true, as
Section III.C will argue, because of the tension between funding criminal and civil counsel.
Formality and delay may be worth the cost when the stakes are
high and the issues are sufficiently complex. Accordingly, the Court
left the door open to providing lawyers when both of those factors are
present. But only a small fraction of child support cases are complex,
and due process rules should be crafted for run-of-the-mill cases, not
85
exceptional ones. Stronger remedies can be reserved for those exceptions.
C. Less Intrusive Alternatives
The final pillar of the Court’s reasoning was that alternative
measures could satisfy due process. The parties had briefed and argued
the case all along as solely a right-to-counsel case, and the merits ques86
tion presented was limited to that issue. Other alternatives were never
considered nor developed below, so there was no record on the range
of alternatives and their efficacy. Justice Thomas’s dissent thus criticized
the majority for reaching an issue raised for the first time on the merits
87
in an amicus brief. Nevertheless, the majority gave significant weight
88
to the Solicitor General’s suggested alternative procedures. Those included (1) notifying defendants that ability to pay will be a critical issue;
(2) using financial disclosure forms; (3) allowing defendants to respond
eighteenth century processed many more cases than modern courts without the constraints of procedure or presence of counsel).
84
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (emphasizing that rules
should be “shaped by . . . the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions”).
86
See Brief for Petitioner at i, 27-51, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); Brief of
Respondents at 65, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10) (noting that “petitioner’s
merits brief explicitly asks for ‘a categorical right to counsel, not merely a case-by-case
right that depends on the merit or complexity of the case’” (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 50 n.24)).
87
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2524-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 2519-20 (majority opinion).
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to follow-up questions about their finances at hearings; and (4) making
89
express findings related to defendants’ abilities to pay.
The Court put particular stock in this suggestion because of the
90
federal government’s expertise in child support enforcement. It also
noted that while these procedures would be constitutionally sufficient,
there might be other alternatives, such as supplying social workers,
91
that could also satisfy due process. Thus, rather than freezing the law
in place, Turner’s holding at least acknowledged the possibility of
achieving the same goal through different means.
These remedies, the Court noted, not only suffice but also avoid
some of the drawbacks of a broad right to counsel. In particular, they
avoid the complexity and delay that could make it harder for pro se
92
custodial parents to collect the support they are owed. In short, the
Court’s reasoning was at least somewhat sensitive to the policy
tradeoffs of mandating appointed counsel across the board.
III. TWO-AND-A-HALF CHEERS FOR TURNER
Turner got it right. First, by refusing to constitutionalize a new civil
Gideon right, the Court avoided imposing a one-size-fits-all rule on a
variety of states and lawsuits. Second, by endorsing much less intrusive
alternatives, the Court steered future developments toward more sustainable pro se court reform. And third, by taking into account the
complexity of the issue and the interests of pro se custodial parents,
the Court accommodated resource constraints and tradeoffs. While
the Court could have been more explicit about the need to triage limited resources, its ruling reinforces a sound policy of husbanding
scarce funds instead of spreading them too thin.
A. The Wisdom of Not Recognizing a Procrustean Right
First, neither Turner nor Lassiter held that counsel may never be
appointed in particularly complicated or contested civil cases. To
the contrary, both cases asked whether the Due Process Clause automatically requires appointed counsel in every termination of parental
89

Id. at 2519.
Cf. id. at 2517 (noting that the “Federal Government has created an elaborate
procedural mechanism designed to help both the government and custodial parents to
secure the payments to which they are entitled”).
91
Id. at 2519.
92
Id. at 2519-20.
90
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93

rights or civil contempt/child support case. An indigent litigant can
still request appointed counsel, and the judge must weigh, case by
94
case, whether fundamental fairness requires appointing a lawyer.
Thus, the question is not whether allowing some defendants to go unrepresented in civil contempt cases is sometimes fundamentally unfair,
but whether it is always or very often unfair. For child support proceedings, the answer is no: the opposing party is often unrepresented
and the issue is simple, so lawyers are not essential across the board.
Second, the Court finally acknowledged that lawyers can sometimes
make proceedings less fair. The Court’s Sixth Amendment cases have
regularly praised counsel as indispensable for procedural fairness. In
Powell, the Court waxed eloquent about how “[t]he right to be heard”
would be hollow without “the guiding hand of counsel” “skill[ed] in the
95
science of law.” Gideon likewise recognized the “obvious truth” that
lawyers uphold the “noble ideal” of “fair trials before impartial tribu96
nals.” And, in Miranda, where the Court sought to protect the right to
remain silent, it mandated warning suspects that they have the right to
97
an attorney. In so doing, the Court praised counsel’s “vital role” in
98
protecting the accused while promoting the administration of justice.
The Court has long equated more lawyers with more justice—but
that faith is finally waning. In other recent cases, the Court has rejected
attorneys’ claims that the lawyer-client relationship or the duty of zeal99
ous advocacy requires special or broader protections. Turner’s turn
93

Id. at 2520; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981)
(“[N]either can we say the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every
parental termination proceeding.”).
94
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-34.
95
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
96
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The Court followed this language with a long quotation of “the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v.
Alabama.” Id.
97
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
98
Id. at 480-81.
99
For example, the Court overturned lower court decisions offering lawyers special
protections from facially neutral statutes in a pair of 2010 cases. See Jerman v. Carlisle,
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1622 (2010) (holding that a
debt-collecting lawyer’s duty to comply with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act overrides the ethical duty to advance his client’s interests); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A.
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1331-33 (2010) (rejecting the argument that the federal
prohibition on debt-relief agencies advising clients to incur more debt before filing for
bankruptcy does not apply to law firms). Similarly, in Montejo v. Louisiana, the Court
held that police officers could contact criminal defendants after the appointment of
counsel. 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2087 (2009). In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected arguments based upon the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship and the existence of
an ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct barring contact with represented parties.
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away from blind faith in lawyers as indispensable for fair trials is a significant part of this landmark development.
B. More Sustainable Pro Se Court Reform
All over the country, state and local courts are deluged by pro se
100
litigants. The crush of pro se litigation has been one of civil Gideon
proponents’ main arguments. Yet the Court and academics have
largely ignored this phenomenon. Outside of the civil Gideon debate,
however, lower courts have begun a quiet procedural revolution. All
over the country, judges, court administrators, legal aid lawyers, and
advocates for the poor have been working together on pro se court
reform. These reforms aim to make court processes simpler, fairer,
and more user-friendly.
Examples of organized pro se court reform abound. In 2005, the
American Judicature Society (AJS) published a guide for judges inter101
The Selfested in making their courts more pro se friendly.
Represented Litigation Network has also published a set of core mate102
rials gathering national best practices. The National Center for State
Courts has published The Self-Help Friendly Court: Designed from the
103
And various research
Ground Up to Work for People Without Lawyers.
Id. As the Court put it, “[T]he Constitution does not codify the ABA’s Model Rules,
and does not make investigating police officers lawyers.” Id.
100
See Gillian Hadfield, A Case for Legal Aid at Wal-Mart, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2010, at A17.
101
See CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y & STATE JUSTICE INST., REACHING OUT
OR OVERREACHING: JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005). The
report presents a list of commonsense steps that judges may take to help pro se litigants, and contains a section on “Proposed Best Practices.” Id. at 51-57. These include
making procedural accommodations, being courteous, avoiding legal jargon and procedural snafus, explaining the process, avoiding over-familiarity with lawyers in the
courtroom, and training court staff to provide patient and helpful service to selfrepresented litigants. Id.
102
See THE SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, CORE MATERIALS ON SELFREPRESENTED LITIGATION INNOVATION (2006) (listing articles and websites that provide
information and research on pro se litigation).
103
RICHARD ZORZA, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT:
DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_ProSe_SelfHelpCtPub.pdf.
The Preface, written by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, chronicles
California’s recent efforts to improve pro se court access, including a nine-hundredpage self-help guide on its website for pro se litigants that is visited over 100,000 times
per month. Id. at 7-8. AJS even has an online forum dedicated to pro se issues. Pro Se
Forum, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/prose/home.asp (last visited Jan. 15,
2012); see also Richard Zorza, Self-Represented Litigants and the Access to Justice Revolution in
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projects have observed and proposed a number of innovative court
104
processes to improve access for pro se litigants.
The national adoption of court-appointed special advocate
(CASA) programs for custody matters serves as a model of innovation
105
These nonlawyer advocates assist
in promoting access to justice.
courts and pro se litigants for a fraction of the cost of retaining an attorney. Turner endorsed these programs by mentioning the possibility
106
of having social workers assist in child support disputes.
Forward-thinking lower courts have established innovative programs as well. For example, the Eastern District of New York has created a special magistrate court for pro se matters, and San Antonio has
107
established a pro se assistance program in its civil courts.
The reports, studies, and programs listed above describe only government-supported pro se efforts. But there are also many for-profit
pro se assistance websites like legalzoom.com and rocketlawyer.com.
If one considers both private and public options, opportunities for
innovative, inexpensive, and effective pro se representation are improving exponentially.
Properly understood, Turner recognizes and protects pro se litigants. It offers courts and poverty advocates a once-in-a-generation
opportunity: the chance to move beyond 1963 solutions to 2012 court
problems. Not every court dispute requires a lawyer’s involvement,
and neither litigants nor society can afford lawyers for each dispute.

the State Courts: Cross-Pollinating Perspectives Toward a Dialogue for Innovation in the Courts
and the Administrative Law System, 29 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 63, 68-74
(2009) (describing various courts’ efforts to expand access to justice including self-help
centers, simplifying forms, improving technological availability, staff training, and others).
104
See, e.g., Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Access to Justice for the SelfRepresented Litigant: An Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers and Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017, 1029-41 (2002) (listing primarily technical solutions proposed by
design and law students after observing problems in self-represented litigation).
105
See, e.g., About Us, CASA FOR CHILDREN, http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/
c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.5301303/k.6FB1/About_Us__CASA_for_Children.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2012) (describing a program of citizen advocates who help place abused children in new homes).
106
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
107
See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se
Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 493-97 (2002) (detailing the
New York program); see also Anita Davis, A Pro Se Program That Is Also “Pro” Judges, Lawyers, and the Public, 63 TEX. B.J. 896, 896 (2000) (describing how Bexar County civil
courts employ a staff attorney to assist courts and pro se litigants in preparing dockets,
coordinating mediation and litigation, and answering general questions).
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Rather than looking backward to Gideon, Turner invites forwardlooking, flexible pro se alternatives.
The danger is that Turner’s minimal suggestions will ossify. Turner
itself suggests rather limited safeguards: notice, a form, an opportuni108
ty to respond at a hearing, and a clear finding. But the Court quite
explicitly stated that these are not “the only possible alternatives” and
that other forms of pro se assistance (like a neutral social worker) may
109
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s suggestions in
also be helpful.
practice often become not only a constitutional floor, but also a ceil110
ing. Instead of falling into this pitfall and abandoning experimentation, lower courts should use Turner as a spur to further innovation.
Judges and court clerks cannot address pro se–heavy dockets by
trying to recreate the traditional adversarial system without lawyers.
Instead, all court personnel must adopt a more managerial posture.
111
Courts in civil-law nations may be apt models for study and imitation.
Courts should also carefully examine the sufficiency of existing pro se
practices. For example, sometimes hearings do not even include ex112
plicit findings of fact.

108

Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519. Ossification would be especially unfortunate because
the Court, reaching the issue sua sponte, did not have the benefit of research or briefing on the various procedures with which states are experimenting to facilitate pro se
access to civil justice.
109
Id.
110
For example, Miranda warnings were supposed to be only one way of preventing
compelled self-incrimination, but the Court’s imprimatur has made them universal. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring the now-famous Miranda warnings “unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it”); Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (concluding that “Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively” partially because “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture”).
111
See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PODOMO, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 34-38 (3d ed. 2007) (contrasting the role of the judge in common law and
civil law courts).
112
In Turner, for example, while the child support court found Turner in contempt, the judge did not indicate on the preprinted contempt-of-court form whether
“he was or was not gainfully employed, nor whether he had the ability to make these
support payments when due.” 131 S. Ct. at 2514. Findings of fact are important to
permit meaningful appellate review of the lower court’s holding and reasoning. In
Turner, civil contempt required a showing of a willful refusal to pay, but there was no
explicit finding on that issue. Id. at 2513.
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Though the Court has finally recognized the need for alternative
procedures, legislatures, academics, court administrators, public interest groups, and others must continue to innovate to promote pro se
access to justice.
C. The Implicit Role of Resource Constraints
We live in a world of scarcity. In the past, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged funding constraints as a reason not to expand the right to counsel: lawyers and complex procedures cost time
113
As
and money, meaning that the needy have less overall funding.
Judge Friendly put it, “[A]t some point the benefit to individuals from
an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of
providing such protection, and . . . the expense of protecting those
likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets
114
of the deserving.”
Based on this scarcity, Congress has specifically declined to fund
appointed counsel in child support–related civil contempt cases such
115
as Turner. Likewise, some states have reserved appointed counsel for
criminal and unusually complex civil cases. State courts usually retain
discretion to appoint counsel in civil actions that are too complex for
116
The Supreme Court has
pro se litigants to defend themselves.
avoided treading on these legislative and judicial judgments.
Civil Gideon advocates tend to focus on one type of case in isolation. But in a world of tight budgets, criminal and civil defense compete for funding. Tradeoffs are inevitable, and the need for appointed
113

See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985)
(giving “great weight” to the government’s interest in avoiding increased administrative
costs for veterans’ hearings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (citing the
“financial cost to the State” of requiring appointed counsel).
114
Friendly, supra note 80, at 1276, quoted with approval in Walters, 473 U.S. at 321 n.9.
115
See S. REP. NO. 98-387, at 23 (1984) (explaining that Congress does not intend to
provide federal matching for expenditures in child support–enforcement programs for
providing defense counsel to indigent parents); see also 45 C.F.R. § 304.23(i)–(j) (2010)
(barring expenditure of federal funds for indigent defense counsel or costs relating to
jailing parents in child support enforcement); Child Support Enforcement Program;
Prohibition of Federal Funding of Costs of Incarceration and Counsel for Indigent
Absent Parents, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,130, 32,130 (Aug. 26, 1987) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
304) (including certain expenses—such as providing defense counsel to indigent parents—in list of expenditures for which federal funds are not available).
116
See, e.g., S.C. APP. CT. R. 608(g)(1) (granting state judges discretion in appointing
counsel but cautioning that “[t]he unnecessary appointment of lawyers . . . places an undue burden on the lawyers of this State”); Ex parte Foster, 565 S.E.2d 290, 293 (S.C. 2002)
(remanding for a determination of whether the action was “so complex” that failing to
appoint a lawyer would “unfairly hamper [respondent’s] ability to defend his case”).
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counsel is far greater in felony cases, especially capital cases. Felony
cases, unlike civil cases, carry a Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
and so entail jury instructions, arguments, and related complexities.
Felony cases also involve elaborate criminal procedures, ranging from
formal rules of evidence to constitutional disclosure requirements.
Felony cases pit individual defendants against experienced, profes117
sional police and prosecutors wielding the power of the state. Felony
convictions often carry collateral consequences, including criminal
records and disqualification from jobs, and they also impose criminal
stigma. And, of course, felony convictions can result in long prison
sentences or even the death penalty.
Some exceptional civil cases may merit counsel, either because
they are particularly complex or because they are otherwise especially
important or meritorious. But these determinations demand case-bycase judgments, not blanket constitutional rules. Legal aid societies
and trial courts already triage their caseloads, selecting a fraction of
civil cases as most deserving and most in need of limited resources.
Constitutional rules would fetter this contextual exercise of discretion
with mandatory, rigid requirements.
Moreover, there is little evidence that lawyers make much of a difference in simple cases. Most studies of lawyers in civil litigation have
been observational case studies flawed by nonrandom assignment of
118
lawyers to possibly more meritorious cases. Two Harvard researchers
reviewed the existing literature and found “astonishingly little credi119
ble, quantitative information about the effect of representation.”
The only two studies that were methodologically sound reached conflicting results; in the one study that found that lawyers affected out120
The
comes, those effects disappeared in informal proceedings.
Harvard researchers have conducted their own randomized, con-

117

Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (“[T]he average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (emphasis added by the Court in Turner)).
118
See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in
Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 56), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1708664 (describing previous studies as “unworthy of credence” and observing
that “the only way to produce credible quantitative results . . . is with randomized trials”).
119
Id. at 69.
120
Id. at 68-69.
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121

trolled study of administrative unemployment hearings. They found
no significant difference in success rates between defendants who were
122
In fact,
offered free legal representation and those who were not.
the only major difference was that introducing lawyers delayed case
123
resolution. Based on these findings, there seems to be little benefit
to providing lawyers across the board, especially in simple cases.
Another empirical study has reached the same conclusion about
routinely appointing counsel in misdemeanor cases. Erica Hashimoto
found that federal pro se misdemeanor defendants average lower rates
of conviction and lower sentences in all categories of cases except for
124
Hashimoto’s research indicates that
driving under the influence.
lawyers appear to add less value in simple misdemeanor cases than in
125
more complex and serious cases.
Because procedures are simpler
and the stakes are lower, lawyers simply have much less to do. A sensible triage policy would take that simplicity into account.
Finally, funding realities mean that states cannot and do not provide civil counsel across the board even where required by law. In
2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the State to appoint
126
counsel before confining nonsupporting parents for civil contempt.
In the wake of that ruling, however, New Jersey was not able to fund
127
such counsel. Thus, until Turner, child support officials had to release
nonsupporting parents who qualified for appointed counsel, instead
128
of enforcing child support through civil contempt.
Likewise, Pennsylvania courts presume that poor defendants are en129
titled to appointed counsel whenever they face loss of physical liberty.
Despite this presumption, Pennsylvania counties have repeatedly failed
121

Id. at 12.
Id. at 26.
123
Id. at 44-45.
124
Hashimoto, supra note 44, at 490-93 & tbls.2-6.
125
Id. at 496.
126
See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 674 (N.J. 2006) (grounding this right in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507 (2011).
127
See Brief of Senators DeMint et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
app. 8a, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10) (reporting data collected by the Office of
Child Support Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
from states’ child support–enforcement authorities, including New Jersey’s).
128
See id. (noting that, because it has no funding, New Jersey had to release all nonsupporting parents found to be indigent if they are held in contempt).
129
See Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 704 A.2d 612, 615-17 (Pa. 1997)
(acknowledging “a presumption” that “an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel . . . when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty” (quoting Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122
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130

to appoint counsel for indigent parents facing civil contempt.
The
civil Gideon right collided with funding realities.
Even where lawyers are appointed in child support cases, they are
often too overburdened to provide much help. They have neither the
time nor resources to investigate the circumstances of the case or provide meaningful counsel to their clients. Often, they can do little
more than parrot to the judge what their clients have told them. “In
many of the [child support] courtrooms we watched, these attorneys
would call out their client’s name as the court room filled with cases,
131
meeting the client for the first time just prior to the hearing.” When
lawyers juggle many cases and learn little about each one, they can add
132
little value for their clients or for the justice system overall.
Yet the public interest bar has been slow to recognize these realities. The American Bar Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Constitution Project have all protested
133
The Center for
the limited funding of criminal defense counsel.
Family Policy and Practice has noted that lawyer-for-a-day programs
134
Yet all of these organizations also filed
provide very few benefits.
135
amicus briefs in Turner in support of a broad civil Gideon right.
Setting aside the American Bar Association’s self-interest in securing more funding for its members, the problem represents a refusal to
accept reality. The organizations hope for a new judicial ruling guaranteeing the right to counsel in civil cases, but at the same time decry
how underfunding subverts existing rights to counsel in practice. New
rulings recognizing expanded rights will not increase the amount of
available funding; instead, they will compete with other rights to coun-

130

See, e.g., Application for Extraordinary Relief Under Pa. R.A.P. § 3309 and King’s
Bench Powers at 10, Cepeda v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 128 MM 2009, slip op. (Pa.
June 24, 2010) (claiming that eight indigent petitioners were imprisoned for contempt
after allegedly failing to pay child support, without being represented by counsel or informed they had a right to counsel); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Ass’n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al., supra note 76, at 28-29 (maintaining that “indigent parents facing
contempt charges in Pennsylvania are not being provided with counsel”).
131
REBECCA MAY & MARGUERITE ROULET, CTR. FOR FAMILY POLICY & PRACTICE, A
LOOK AT ARRESTS OF LOW-INCOME FATHERS FOR CHILD SUPPORT NONPAYMENT: ENFORCEMENT, COURT AND PROGRAM PRACTICES 45 (2005), available at http://www.cprmn.org/Documents/noncompliance.pdf.
132
See id. (noting that adding lawyers with high case turnover will do little to “persuade a judge to be lenient, even when the facts of the case might merit leniency”).
133
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
134
See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
135
See supra note 76.
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sel, spreading funding ever thinner. The result may be a Pyrrhic victory:
lawyer-for-a-day programs that provide counsel in name only.
CONCLUSION
Turner arrives at a particularly interesting time for the judiciary
and the legal profession. While technology has transformed most other areas of life, court-based dispute resolution has remained remarkably impervious to change. Courts across the country must adapt an
adversary system designed to be navigated by expert counsel to the
realities of mass pro se representation.
If pro se reform is to go beyond the bare minimum, stakeholders
must work together. Judges, court administrators, and clerks must accelerate their efforts to accommodate the pro se flood. Judges need to
recognize that, in many pro se cases, a more aggressive and inquisitorial approach is appropriate. Court clerks must cease refusing to answer questions or assist pro se litigants for fear of the unauthorized
practice of law.
Bar associations and judges will likewise need to rethink strict enforcement of unauthorized-practice-of-law rules. Throughout the
economy, routine and mechanical tasks are being outsourced or handled by computers. Lawyers can try in vain to stem that tide by prosecuting unauthorized practice of law, or they can abandon cookiecutter cases and focus on those that need individualized legal judgment. Where the law is simple and disputes are factual, paralegals,
investigators, and social workers can help to investigate facts, marshal
evidence, and prepare clients to tell their own stories.
The real danger to the legal profession has always been that pro se
court reform will spread upwards from the poor to the middle class
and beyond. Certainly, paid divorce lawyers have little incentive to
support straightforward, cheap, and fast pro se divorces for the poor.
What is bad for lawyers, however, may be good for citizens and the
economy as a whole by reducing the deadweight burden of legal fees.
Technology may make these disputes moot sooner rather than later.
In the meantime, the Court in Turner was right to recognize that more
lawyers do not always equal more justice and that fair pro se procedures are better for everyone. Other actors must now translate pro se
court reform from Turner’s sketch into a viable pro se system.
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